

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3



Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

SP - 9/74
31 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

1. Reference: Memorandum for the Record, subject as above, dated
22 January 1974 covering meeting of 18 January 1974.

2. At the request of the NIO a third meeting was held on 25 January
1974 to discuss the proposed national intelligence program covering the next
six months. The following were in attendance.

| | |
|-------|---------------------------|
| | Howard Stoertz, Jr. (NIO) |
| 25X1A | [redacted] (NIO) |
| | (OSR) |
| 25X1A | [redacted] (OWI) |
| | (OWI) |
| 25X1A | [redacted] (OSI) |
| | (State) |
| 25X1A | [redacted] (DIA, DI) |
| 25X1A | [redacted] (A, DT) |
| | (DIA, DE) |
| | (NSA) |

3. Mr. Stoertz opened the meeting by describing his discussions with
three representative consumers of national intelligence products. He said
that all three responded favorably to the proposed program. Mr. Stoertz
then went through the list, noting comments by the customers.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3

SP - 9/74

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

a. There was no comment on the SALT Monitoring Report.

b. Mr. Stoertz reported that in discussing "Prospects for Determining Accuracies of New Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs," Jan Lodal suggested that the paper also assess how well the Soviets can determine the accuracy of their own missiles; what uncertainties do they face? Mr. Brandwein noted that the problem of determining US accuracies has been a major concern of Secretary Schlesinger. He added that to do the job properly would require more time than is available to GMAIC. Mr. Stoertz acknowledged that no study of Soviet accuracy is likely to result in as definitive solution as desired, but said that it is important to do the best we can by the end of the fiscal year. At that time, intelligence must set its goals and targets for the second half of the year. Thus, this report will not necessarily be the only action, and other issuances and programs of research and collection may be needed.

c. There was no comment from the customers on the PQR.

d. With respect to the "Capabilities and Intended Deployment of the Backfire Force," Mr. Stoertz reported that Secretary Schlesinger and to a lesser extent General Shedd complained that intelligence spends too much time arguing and not enough time measuring the uncertainties, i.e. not enough time analyzing the implications of uncertainties in quantitative terms. Mr. Stoertz said that the range of Backfire is now a problem and will continue to be. He asked whether we can better serve the user by putting up reasonable alternative flight profiles and missions. Asked to expand on this approach, Mr. Stoertz noted that there are three areas of potential employment for Backfire-- Europe and the Mediterranean, China, and the US, all of which require different deployment modes (refueling or not, subsonic or supersonic, etc.). He asked whether a way can be found to convey range capabilities under these different modes. [] noted that the use of Backfire is insensitive to range uncertainties to an extent in that all will fall within a certain middle ground. [] asked if refueling was not the key item, observing that Secretary Schlesinger seemed to want more on intended employment than capabilities. Mr. Stoertz responded that if we cannot answer

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3

SP - 9/74

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

that, then can we show the effectiveness of Backfire under alternative assumptions about employment. After some discussion about whether we were to address "possible" or "intended" employment it was agreed to change both the title and scope note on this project, to delete the word "intended" preceding employment but to make clear in the purpose and scope that we want to cover all possible uses of the bomber.

25X1A e. Mr. Stoertz said there was no special reaction from the customers on the proposed study to investigate whether the Soviets are developing a new generation ballistic missile submarine system. Mr. Stoertz noted that although Jan Lodai's assistant had some questions, Secretary Schlesinger was not very interested. He said that the Secretary had commented that if the US wanted such a system, so would the Soviets. Mr. Stoertz said that he was no longer inclined to put this project on the current list of issuances and recommended dropping at this time. His reasons were that the subject was particularly dependent on the evidence available and that all agencies would be examining this topic regularly in any case. [] asked why it had been on the list in the first place and Mr. Stoertz said that it had been his own idea. It was also noted that this subject was one of the "Key Intelligence Questions."

f. Mr. Stoertz reported that the customers all agreed that the projects on Soviet open ocean detection and laser research were needed. He said that Lodai had raised the problem whether all intelligence participants had the necessary access to special Navy information, and Mr. Stoertz said that this was a problem to be faced. Mr. Lodai also recommended that the working group on this report be made aware that Mr. Gordon Mo of the NSC staff had been conducting a panel on US laser programs.

g. Mr. Stoertz said that the customers had all indicated an interest in seeing the project on the Chinese missile threat expanded to include the threat to the USSR. Lodai said that he would like to see an assessment also of likely Soviet knowledge of the Chinese threat, actual and potential.

h. Mr. Stoertz said that the customers suggested no additional projects.

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3

SP - 9/74

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

4. The remainder of the meeting was spent discussing the role of State/INR in the preparation of national intelligence products. Mr. Meyers said that State wished to collaborate on the preparation of all issuances. Mr. Stoertz called Mr. Meyers' attention to the change in format, which now denotes "principal" collaborators. He said that from the NIO point of view, he was deliberately trying to pick the minimum number of people, capable of making substantive contributions, to participate in preparing papers. He added that he did not believe having everyone participate on every paper was consistent with Mr. Colby's goal of streamlining production methods. Mr. Meyers said that he wished to enter a reservation to that approach. Mr. Stoertz asked what he should do in light of that reservation inasmuch as he had hoped to inform the principals of the agencies at the conclusion of this meeting that the program was underway. Mr. Meyers said, "Just add State to all of the projects." Mr. Stoertz said that he would call Mr. Hyland to discuss this matter.

5. Mr. Meyers informed the participants that INR was trying to expand in order to become active collaborators on strategic and technical matters and that its contributions would examine capabilities as well as intentions. Mr. Brandwein said that it was not logical to include State on papers such as that on Backfire because it lacked capabilities and collection programs and because on complex problems such as Backfire even CIA and DIA must rely on the aircraft industry. Stoertz said that the manner of choosing principal collaborators was related to solving intricate, technical problems facing policymakers in a more speedy and streamlined way. He added that he did not see how to include all agencies in every project without having all projects end up going through the laborious coordination process of NIEs and SNIEs. It was brought out in discussion that all agencies would have the opportunity to review drafts and comment upon them, although comments from agencies other than the principal collaborators would be advisory only. Mr. Meyers pointed out that it was difficult to make much of an input to a paper once it reached draft stage and that substantive contributions are best made in the process of drafting. [] said that if DIA were excluded from certain reports, he would agree with Mr. Meyers' point of view. In response, it was pointed out that unlike INR, DIA had large production resources and could be expected to make an important contribution to any paper dealing with strategic programs. At the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. Stoertz said that he would consult with his fellow NIOs prior to speaking with []. He asked Mr. Meyers 25X1A if he was saying that INR could not imagine a study they would not be included on and Mr. Meyers said yes. In conclusion, Mr. Stoertz asked Mr. Meyers if all the studies listed should be NIEs, and the latter said that question was beyond his competence to address.

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3

SP - 9/74

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

25X1A 6. Mr. Stoertz informed the participants in the meeting that he planned an information memo to the directors of DIA, INR, and NSA outlining the proposed production program and noting agreement in the interagency meetings on the subjects to be studied. Referring back to the issue raised by Mr. Meyers, Mr. Brandwein emphasized that this was an important issue and not just a bureaucratic dust up; it was a question of whether there will be a new departure from the old way of doing business or whether every inter-agency product will be a USIB/NIE. [] said that one approach would be to have State and DIA included as principal collaborators on every project as the two agencies in USIB most heavily involved with customers. Col. [] pointed out that the services were also deeply involved in dealing with customers. 25X1A

7. Mr. Stoertz distributed revised copies of the project list as well as scope notes on each of the proposed issuances. He also urged prompt appointment of action officers in each agency for the several projects and asked that these names be forwarded to the NIO office.

8. Mr. Stoertz stated that subject to some resolution of the problem raised by Mr. Meyers, this would be the last session of the group before launching the production program. He expressed his appreciation to the participants and the meeting was adjourned.

[]

Robert M. Gates
Assistant to the
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070039-3

SECRET